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I. INTRODUCTION
To combat illegal immigration, the United States removes violent,
criminal aliens to their home countries.' In 1996, Congress expanded the
offenses that constitute an "aggravated felony" and eliminated relief
from removal of such crimes.' These laws had radical effects on the
t Executive Editor of the University of Miami Law Review. I dedicate this note to my
parents, Miriam and Jesus, whose diligence, bravery, and kindness I can never match. I thank
Professor Abraham for his input. I am also grateful for the editing help of Jarrod Martin and
Jenniifer Maurer. Special thankS to 1- Me-~ -- Aric an -.iti Sts.-.. lllllIl ~lt~l~l op~l . tli~llh t Ilr~llbnld £ IQUIUWIL (11U lbtlll OLabtlZ .
1. Before April 1, 1997, the United States "deported" aliens physically present in the United
States. After April 1, 1997, an alien may be either "deportable" or "inadmissible" when physically
inside the United States. The word "removed" captures removal of an alien on "deportation" and
"inadmissibility" grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000). I use "removed" for any removal,
whether based on "deportation" or "inadmissibility," that occurred after April 1, 1997. However,
most people still use "deportation" in the wider sense. Thus, some quotations might use
"deported" or "deportation," when, in reality, the proper legal terms are "removed" and
"removal."
2. Specifically, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, changed the immigration laws.
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removal of aliens to Central America. Generally, the miniscule number
of removed criminal aliens fails to change the socioeconomic realities in
the criminals' home countries. Central America differs in two aspects.
First, Central America has a large population of aliens in the United
States.3 Second, Central American nations have small,4 indigent
populations.'
As such, the United States' removal of violent aliens to Central
American nations disturbs the socioeconomic reality in those countries.
This disruption creates consequences both abroad and in the United
States. In the Central American nations,6 the removals have promoted a
violent gang culture.7 Specifically, two Central American gangs, Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Calle 18 (18th Street),8 became the largest and
most infamous gangs.9 The removal policy still perpetuates the gang cul-
ture. This culture creates havoc among the local population and creates
brutal responses to the increasing crime by the Central American gov-
ernments. 10 Furthermore, the havoc in Central America creates incen-
tives for Central Americans to migrate illegally to the United States. I I
Worse, previously removed gang members migrate to the United States
as well.' 2 As such, the ties between Central American and homegrown
3. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
at 41 U.N. Sales No. B.07.IV.5 (2007) (noting that some claim that nearly twenty percent of El
Salvador's population lives in the United States).
4. As of 2005, El Salvador had about 6,880,000 inhabitants; Guatemala 12,600,000; and
Honduras 7,200,000. INT'L MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 277, 323,
336 (2006).
5. See Melissa James, Fleeing the Maras: Child Gang Members Seeking Refugee Status in
the United States, 25 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 4 (2005).
6. Throughout this paper, "the Central American nations" refers to El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras. The gang problem has hit these three nations the hardest.
7. Tara Pinkham, Note, Assessing the Collateral International Consequences of the U.S.'
Removal Policy, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 223, 234 (2006).
8. Many simply call MS-13 "Mara Salvatrucha," and many simply call 18th Street "Mara
18." See Violence in Central America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter Violence in Central America]
(statement of Josd Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of Guatemala to the United States).
Since sources use the different nomenclatures, this paper uses "MS- 13" and "Mara Salvatrucha"
interchangeably. It also uses "18th Street" and "Mara 18" interchangeably.
9. See Lainie Reisman, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Responding to Central American Youth
Gang Violence, SAIS REV., Summer-Fall 2006, at 147, 148.
10. Concerning Central American reaction to the gang violence, El Salvador has passed laws
that outlaw membership in gangs. Juan J. Fogelbach, Note, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley
Anti Mara: El Salvador's Struggle To Reclaim Social Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 223, 225
(2005). Honduras has also outlawed gang membership. James, supra note 5, at 5.
11. See Tyche Hendricks, San Salvador's Mayor Uses Visit To Address Transnational Gang
Issue, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 2007, at B 12 (noting that the miiyor of San Salvador believes youths
escape El Salvador because of the gangs).
12. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W.
Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 44 (2005) [hereinafter Gangs and
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gangs strengthen, and the problem swells.
While recognizing the problem of the maras, the United States does
little to mitigate the problem. The United States continues to remove any
aggravated felon under the expanded definition of "aggravated felony,"
regardless of the alien's ties to the United States. Furthermore, even
when aliens confront legitimate violence at the hands of the maras, the
asylum legal frame refuses to recognize the peril of these aliens.
This article explains the faults of the current removal policy and
offers solutions to mitigate the growing violence in Central America.
Part II discusses the United States' removal policy. Part III explains the
myriad problems that this removal policy produces in Central America
and within the United States. Part IV discusses how the United States'
current law fails to further the United States' interests and how courts
refuse to mitigate this damage through asylum. Part V offers possible
solutions.
II. THE UNITED STATES' CURRENT POLICY OF
CENTRAL AMERICAN REMOVAL
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIR) 13 and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' 4 These laws
expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" and obliterated avenues
of relief from removal. 5 Even though Los Angeles gave life to the
maras,16 the United States ships the gang members to Central America.
Additionally, the United States does not generally give an alien's crimi-
nal history to the nations to which the United States removes the alien."7
Some estimate that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) never
criminally charges seventy percent of gang members that ICE arrests for
removal.' s Thus, even though the United States gives a removed alien's
Crime in Latin America] (prepared statement of Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for
Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage
Foundation).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
14. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
15. See 110 Stat. at 3009-594, -627 to -628.
16. NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS Ass'NS, 2005 NATIONAL GANG THREAT
ASSESSMEr 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2005_threatasses
ment.pdf.
17. Deportees in Latin America and the Caribbean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W.
Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 10th Cong. 24-26 (2007) [hereinafter
Deportees in Latin America] (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant Director for Management,
Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
18. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 23,
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criminal record when the alien's crime caused the removal,' 9 numerous
gang members end up in Central America without the Central American
nations' knowledge. Facing these criminals without a decent justice sys-
tem, Central America reacted with repressive, draconian laws.
A. The Central American Gangs' History and Organization
Composed of Central Americans,20 the maras are originally an
American phenomenon. For example, MS-13, one of the better-known
Central American gangs,2" began when Salvadoran aliens in Los Ange-
les formed to defend themselves from other Hispanic gangs.22 The "13"
in MS-13 comes from California gang nomenclature.23 Indeed, the "13"
signifies that the MS align themselves with the gangs of Southern Cali-
fornia.24 Similarly, the "18" in 18th Street signifies the gang's birth on
Los Angeles's Eighteenth Street.25 Originally created in the 1960s with-
out any ethnic or national-origin prerequisites, the 18th Street gang
began to recruit Salvadorans who sought defense from Mexican gangs.
As Salvadoran aliens made a decision to join either the multiethnic 18th
Street or the newly formed-and primarily Salvadoran-MS-13, a
rivalry between 18th Street and MS-13 exploded.26
From Los Angeles, these gangs expanded throughout the United
States. Now, MS-13 has members in thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia. 27 Through the United States' removal policy, the gangs
spread to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Estimates vary on the
size of Central American gangs. Some estimates state that gangs have
"an estimated 25,000 members in El Salvador ...[with] comparable
numbers in Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States. 28 Honduran
officials estimate that Honduras has 20,000 active gang members.29 Esti-
19. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 26 (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant
Director for Management, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) ("We provide
the information on the criminal charges that lead to [the alien's] deportation.").
20. For example, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans primarily compose MS-13.
Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 20 (prepared statement of Chris Swecker,
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
21. See Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 224.
22. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 39.
23. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 19 (prepared statement of Chris
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
24. See id.
25. James, supra note 5, at 3.
26. U.N. OFFIcE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 59.
27. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 18 (testimony of Chris Swecker,
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
28. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 23.
29. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez,
Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
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mates on the number of gang members in Guatemala vary from 14,000
to 100,000.30 Estimates of total Central American gang membership
extend from 70,000 to 300,000.31 Other sources place the number of
gang members in Central America as high as 500,000.32 While estimates
of Central American gang sizes vary, people agree that the gang mem-
bers tend to be young males. As an example, of the gang members in
Honduras, nearly ninety-eight' percent fall within the twelve- and
twenty-five-year-old range.33 Additionally, Guatemalan gang members
usually join gangs when only thirteen-years-old.34 Shockingly, the gangs
even recruit eight-year-old children.35 Moreover, gang recruitment of
these youths need not arise peacefully. 36 Still, although young, the Cen-
tral American gangs execute various crimes.
These gangs traffic in drugs, guns, and people.37 Distinctly, connec-
tions exist between gang members and organized crime. Although gang
members do not directly become organized-crime members, "narco-
bosses work closely with leaders of the most sophisticated transnational
gangs."'38 In Honduras, the gangs steal guns, act as murderers-for-hire,
kidnap, and extort taxes.39
This rampant crime requires organization. The maras organize
themselves around "cliques."40 For MS-13, a local leader called the
"shot caller" leads the clique. 4 Usually, the cliques stand as discrete,
independent cells.42 However, some cliques engage in meetings with
other cliques, and, at these meetings, gang members pay attendance fees,
share intelligence on law enforcement, and organize transactions.43 This
30. Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Jos6 Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of
Guatemala to the United States).
31. Id. at 2 (statement of Jos6 Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of Guatemala to the
United States).
32. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 60.
33. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez,
Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
34. Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Jos6 Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of
Guatemala to the United States).
35. Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to
the United States).
36. See James, supra note 5, at 6 ("Child gang members are frequently coerced into joining a
mara by virtue of their child status and factors defining their social context.").
37. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 5 (prepared statement of Josd Guillermo
Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of Guatemala to the United States).
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to
the United States).
40. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 20 (prepared statement of Chris
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
41. Id.
42. See Chris Kraul et al., L.A. Violence Crosses the Line, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at Al.
43. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 20 (prepared statement of Chris
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
interaction between cliques includes gang leaders from the United States
and El Salvador.'
In addition, this interaction has bolstered MS-13's ability to infil-
trate other cities around the United States. Unlike other gangs, the maras
have shown a willingness to create new cliques in other cities. For
example, the MS-13 cliques in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area
resulted from Los Angeles MS-13 members' effort to recruit in D.C.
4 5
MS-13 entered Seattle when Los Angeles MS-13 members traveled to
Seattle to sell drugs.4 6 MS-13's ability to expand might help explain its
ability to communicate throughout the United States.47
A quick panoramic of the maras indicates gangs born in the United
States, which then spread to Central America. The maras have over-
whelming numbers in Central America. These members are young. The
gangs partake in crimes, including crimes usually undertaken only by
organized crime. While consisting of independent cells, the cells of the
maras show a tendency to communicate among themselves and even
hold meetings.
B. The United States Removes Gang Members to Central America
While no single reason created the gang-violence surge in Central
America, the United States' removal policy certainly fed the violence.48
In 1996, Congress passed 11RIR 49 and AEDPA.5° These laws expanded
the definition of "aggravated felony." For example, AEDPA added
offenses such as commercial bribery and obstruction of justice to the
definition of "aggravated felony."'" Under the new definition of "aggra-
vated felony," the United States can remove an alien for committing an
"aggravated felony" even if the alien only committed a misdemeanor.52
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation);
see also Robert J. Lopez et al., Gang Uses Deportation to Its Advantage To Flourish in the U.S.,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at Al.
44. Kraul et al., supra note 42 ("Gang leaders in the U.S. and El Salvador have shared
information on informants, discussed punishing rivals and plotted an ambush to free an accused
murderer.").
45. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 18 (testimony of Chris Swecker,
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
46. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
47. See discussion infra Part III.B.
48. See Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 13 (prepared statement of Roberto
Flores Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States) ("A contribution to the surge of
gangs in Honduras has been the deportation of active members from gangs from the United States,
as well as their circulation and movement through Central America and Mexico to return legally
or illegally from and to the United States.").
49. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
50. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
51. Id. at 1277-78 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (2000)).
52. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Congress, since it did not
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Furthermore, because of the new laws, crimes of violence, theft, or bur-
glary became aggravated felonies if accompanied with a sentence of one
year, in contrast to the five years previously required.53 After these laws,
a one-year suspended sentence resulting from shoplifting may result in
an "aggravated felony."54 AEDPA applied similar changes in imprison-
ment terms for obstruction-of-justice charges,55 gambling offenses,56
and commercial bribery.57 Because of the change in the definition of
"aggravated felony," along with a bar on relief for aggravated felons,58
the United States has "deported more than 670,000 immigrants because
of criminal convictions. 59
The statutory changes caused a radical shift in the United States'
removals. In the early 1990s, the United States deported about 40,000
aliens per year.60 Presently, the United States removes over 200,000
aliens each year.6 1 In 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) deported 33,189 aliens. 62 By 1995, the INS deported 50,924
aliens.63 Although the number of deportations increased, it did so at an
average of 3547 aliens per year.64 In contrast, in 1997, after the immi-
gration-law reforms, the number of removals jumped nearly sixty-four
percent to 114,432.65 Furthermore, removals based on criminal reasons
soared to 34,113 by 1997.66 That constitutes more than a 135% increase
over the 1991 number of criminal deportations. Unsurprisingly, the pat-
tern of increasing removals and criminal removals also applies to the
Central American nations.
In 1996, deportations to El Salvador numbered 2360.67 Deporta-
specifically articulate that aggravated felonies cannot be misdemeanors, intended to have the term
aggravated felony apply to the broad range of crimes listed in the statute, even if these include
misdemeanors.").
53. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)-(J)).
54. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000).
55. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. at 1278 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S)).
56. Id. at 1277 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(J)).
57. Id. at 1278 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(R)).
58. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(8), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(l)(B).
59. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Rep. Eliot L. Engel,
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 217 tbl.62 (2002).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 188 tbl.69 (1997).
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tions to Guatemala numbered 1980, and deportations to Honduras num-
bered 2693 that same year. 68 These numbers showed increases from
earlier in the 1990s. In fact, in 1993, El Salvador numbered 1975 depor-
tations, Guatemala numbered 1256 deportations, and Honduras num-
bered 1605 deportations. 69  Between 1992 and 1995, the 1975
deportations El Salvador faced constituted the highest number of depor-
tations for any of the three nations.7°
While the number of deportees hovered between 1137 and 1975 for
the Central American nations between 1992 and 1995,71 the numbers
spiked, and all three nations had over 3000 removals or deportees in
1997.72 In 1998, the INS removed or deported 5315 Salvadorans, 5120
Guatemalans, and 5105 Hondurans.73 Notably, the INS only deported
1001 Salvadorans,74 while the INS removed 4314 Salvadorans.75 Thus,
the INS removed over four times the number of Salvadorans under the
law as amended by the IIRIR and AEDPA than it deported using the
previous laws.76 The same pattern appears for Guatemalans and
Hondurans.77 In 2001, the INS removed nearly 12,000 Salvadorans,
Guatemalans, or Hondurans; 78 in 2003, the INS removed over 19,000
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, or Hondurans; 79 and, by 2006, the number of
Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran removals increased to 55,000.80
Not only has the United States increased removals to Central
America, but it has also increased criminal removals. The Central Amer-
ican nations have confronted an increasing wave of criminal removals.
For example, in 1996, the INS removed only 1025 Salvadorans for crim-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 187 tbl.68.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 179 tbl.64 (1999).
73. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 217 tbl.65 (2000).
74. See id. This means that the INS deported 1001 Salvadorans under the law in effect prior to
April 1, 1997. See id. at 217 n.2.
75. See id. at 217 tbl.65. This indicates that, although only capable of deporting 1001
Salvadorans under the old laws, the INS removed 4313 Salvadorans under the new laws. See id. at
217 n.3.
76. See id. at 217 nn.2-3.
77. See id. at 217 tbl.65.
78. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 257 tbl.65 (2003).
79. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 173 tbl.43 (2006).
80. See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 13 (prepared statement of Gary Mead,
Assistant Director for Management, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
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inal or narcotic convictions.81 The number of criminal Hondurans and
Guatemalans removed numbered 1049.82 By 1998, the number of crimi-
nal removals of Salvadorans increased by more than 600 to 1711.83 The
criminal removals of Guatemalans and Honduras that year nearly
doubled from the 1996 removals;84 and, by 2003, criminal removals
averaged nearly 1776 to each of the countries.85 Fiscal year 2006 saw
5559 criminal removals to Honduras, 3589 criminal removals to Guate-
mala, and 3679 criminal removals to El Salvador.86 Indeed, between
1998 and 2005, the United States sent about 46,000 convicts to Central
America.87 As these removals from the United States increased, Central
Americans gained a view that the United States flooded Central America
with criminals.
The view that the United States flooded Central America with
criminals expanded to incorporate the notion that the United States ref-
uses to share its criminal information with the Central American nations.
This perception by the Central American nations has foundation. When
the United States removes a criminal, ICE has claimed that the United
States gives the removed criminal's nation a form detailing the alien's
criminal history.88 But the nations receiving a removed criminal alien
only receive information concerning the criminal charges that caused the
removal.89 Thus, the United States does not give the nation an alien's
entire criminal history when removing the alien.90
Nor do the insufficiencies halt there. Because the United States
only "provide[s] the information on the criminal charges that lead to [an
alien's] deportation," '9 the Central American nations get no information
if the United States removes a gang member for non-criminal reasons.
As some estimate that nearly seventy percent of Central American gang
members removed never face criminal charges,92 the United States' pol-
81. INS, supra note 67, at 188 tbl.69.
82. See id.
83. See INS, supra note 73, at 225 tbl.66.
84. See id.
85. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 79, at 173 tbl.43.
86. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 13 (prepared statement of Gary Mead,
Assistant Director for Management, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
87. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUoS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 40.
88. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 31 (written response from John P.
Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Human Smuggling and Public Safety Division, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
89. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 25-26 (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant
Director for Management, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id. at 26.
92. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 24.
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icy of providing criminal information only for criminal removals leaves
the Central American nations uninformed. Unfortunately, no alternative
exists to removing gang members without bringing charges, since many
gang members came to the United States illegally and no evidence exists
with which to prosecute them.9 3 Certainly, many gang members that the
United States removes lack any criminal history. Thus, the Central
American nations may still feel uninformed about the massive removal
of aliens from the United States.94 This sense of misinformation, along
with Central America's limited resources, can only fuel hopelessness.
C. Central America Cannot Cope with the Removals
If the United States struggles with its gang problem, the Central
American nations certainly falter in their attempt to combat the gang
problem. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras constitute impover-
ished nations. According to a 2000 survey, about thirty-one percent of El
Salvador's population lived on less than one dollar a day.95 Fifty-eight
percent of El Salvador's population lived on less than two dollars a
day.9 6 About twenty percent of Honduras's population lived on less than
one dollar a day, and forty-four percent lived on less than two dollars a
day.9 7 Similarly, sixteen percent of Guatemalans lived on less than one
dollar a day, and thirty-eight percent lived on less than two dollars a
day.98 Thus, the populations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
are impoverished, even when compared to neighboring Latin American
nations. 99
Moreover, underemployment averages about sixty-five percent in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras."° In 2004, unemployment
reached over 45,000 Salvadoran men between the ages of twenty and
93. Id. at 26.
94. See Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 21-22 (testimony of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States) (stating that the United States gave
Honduras no information regarding gang membership); Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra
note 12, at 30 (statement of Rep. Robert Menendez, Member, Subcomm. on the Western
Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on International Relations) (noting that Latin Americans tell him
that criminals end up in Central America without warning); Pinkham, supra note 7, at 235 (noting
that Central American nations blame crime rates on the United States' removals).
95. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 278
tbl.A1 (2005).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. James, supra note 5, at 4 ("According to the World Bank, the countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are among the poorest countries in the world, and they are
certainly the poorest in the Americas.").
100. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 44 (prepared statement of Stephen
C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
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twenty-nine." ° ' Another 24,200 fifteen- to nineteen-year-old males
lacked jobs in El Salvador in 2004.102 Considering that people under
twenty-four years of age constitute over half of El Salvador's popula-
tion, 10 3 that people under eighteen constitute nearly half of Honduras's
population,"° and that people under twenty-nine constitute seventy per-
cent of Guatemala's population, 05 such levels of underemployment and
unemployment among youths causes disharmony. This disharmony
manifests itself as gangs and crime. Ominously, the U.S. Census Bureau
estimates that Guatemala's population will increase by sixty percent
from 2000 levels by 2020 and estimates that El Salvador's population
will increase by forty percent in the same span. 10 6 As such, the unem-
ployment and underemployment problem will not simply dematerialize.
This, along with poverty, leads to the continuation of the crime waves.
Beyond the crime, poverty leads to lackluster police and legal infra-
structures. Where in the United States 326 police officers exist for every
100,000 citizens, between El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, only
El Salvador has a comparable rate.'0 7 For example, Guatemala has 119
officers per 100,000 citizens, and Honduras has 104 police officers for
every 100,000 citizens."0 8 Already facing problems from post-civil war
and unemployment crime problems, 10 9 undermanned police forces in the
Central American nations faced about 5000 criminal removals from the
United States each year between 1998 and 2002.1" Far worse, the police
in those nations struggle to solve homicides."' With such conditions,
101. See INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, 2006 YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS, VOLUME 1: TIME
SERIES 466 tbl.3B (2006).
102. Id.
103. S. Lynne Walker, Gang Members Deported from U.S. Take Deadly Culture to Their
Home Countries, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 16, 2005, at Al.
104. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez,
Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
105. Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Jos6 Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of
Guatemala to the United States).
106. WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, CRIME, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATLn AMERICA 16
(2003), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ppcrime-democracy-inlatinamerica%5
B 1%5D.pdf.
107. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 31 fig.14 (showing El Salvador
has 362 officers for every 100,000 citizens).
108. Id.
109. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 43-44 (prepared statement of
Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
110. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, at 255 tbl.66 (2002); OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note
79, at 169 tbl.43.
111. El Salvador had a forty-four percent "clearance rate" of homicides. U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 30-31. Guatemala had an absurd seven percent "clearance
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crime soared. "2
Lacking the enforcement and legal means to stem gang violence,
the Central American countries enacted highly repressive laws. 1 3 For
example, Honduras made "illicit association" a legal crime, punishable
with twelve years in prison." 4 Under this crime, simply belonging to a
gang meant years in prison. El Salvador passed a similar law that associ-
ates men with tattoos to gangs." 5 One expert stated, "If, say, former
Secretary of State George Schultz were to go to El Salvador today and
somehow reveal the fact that he got a tattoo in the Navy during World
War II, he might be subject to arrest.""' 6 Although the expert probably
exaggerated, the laws passed by Honduras and El Salvador endanger
civil liberties.
The Central American governments began enforcing these laws,
with Honduras arresting over 1500 tattooed men only seventeen months
after passing its laws." 7 Not to be outdone, El Salvador made over
19,000 gang-related arrests between 2003 and 2004. i8 Expectedly, El
Salvador's prison population doubled between 2000 and 2005. "9 Unsat-
isfied with civilian power, Guatemala deployed army troops to crime-
infested neighborhoods in Guatemala City.' 2° Because of the United
States' removal policy 12' and because of the Central American nations'
policies of mass arrest, Central American prisons flooded. Unfortu-
nately, the Central American nations not only lack sufficient resources
to combat crime but also lack the resources to incarcerate such volumes
of gang members.
rate" of homicides in 2000. Id. "Clearance rate" is the percentage of crimes solved by the police.
Id.
112. See Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 9 (statement of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States) ("Honduran police estimate that from
1998 to 2003 law violations by gang members under age 18 increased 250 percent.").
113. Walker, supra note 103.
114. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 15-16 (prepared statement of Roberto
Flores Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
115. See Walker, supra note 103.
116. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 67 (testimony of Stephen C.
Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
117. Walker, supra note 103.
118. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 46 (prepared statement of
Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
119. Pinkham, supra note 7, at 236.
120. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 46 (prepared statement of Stephen
C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
121. Salvadoran officials claimed that "[a]bout 60% of the gang members in the national
prison system... are U.S. deportees or had fled the U.S. to avoid criminal prosecution." Lopez et
al., supra note 43.
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The high influx of criminals overwhelms the Central American
nations' prison systems. For instance, officials built one Salvadoran
prison to hold 500 inmates. It now holds nearly 1000 inmates.1 22 Prisons
in Central America hold 125% of their capacity, and El Salvador's pris-
ons hold 169% of their capacity. 123 Similarly, prisons in Honduras have
an occupancy rate of 219.71%.124 Guatemala has a lower overcrowding
rate, but Guatemalan prisons still hold 122% of their capacity.1
25
Thus, Central America finds itself with hardened criminals that
grew and learned their trade in the United States, an American policy
that seeks to remove criminals out of the United States, and insufficient
resources to combat crime. The quick "solution" to the crime curtailed
civil liberties and created over-crowded prisons. Yet, the quick solution
resolved nothing.1 26 Violent crimes in Central America have not
changed, Central America's problems have helped foster criminal ties
between Central America and the United States, and the problems have
exacerbated the United States' illegal immigration problems.
27
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE REMOVAL POLICY
Passing oppressive laws in the hopes of undermining the bur-
geoning gang culture, 128 the Central American nations still face rising
homicide rates. 129 Central America further faces overwhelmed prisons,
in which death, escape, and prisoner collusion frequently occur. Passing
broad removal immigration laws, the United States now faces an inter-
national criminal organization with ties to drug, arms, and human traf-
ficking. 3 ' Furthermore, the maras continue to expand in the United
States. MS-13 now has a presence in Los Angeles,' Maryland, 132 Bos-
122. Id.
123. Better Education for Youth Cuts Crime in Central America, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec.
12, 2007.
124. JUSTICE STUDIES CTR. OF THE AMS., REPORT ON JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN THE AMERICAS
2004-9f05, at 254 (2006).
125. Id. at 231. Part III, section B of this paper explains how this overcrowding has allowed the
gangs to augment their international communications.
126. See discussion infra Part III.A.
127. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
128. Walker, supra note 103.
129. See Inds Benftez, Guatemala: Homicide Rate Soars, Except in Indigenous Areas, IPS/
GIN, Dec. 13, 2007.
130. See Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 5 (prepared statement of Josd Guillermo
Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of Guatemala to the United States).
131. See Ari B. Bloomekatz, 32 Alleged Gang Members Arrested in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2007, at B4.
132. See Ruben Castaneda, 3 MS-13 Leaders Convicted in Killings, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
2007, at B2.
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ton, 133 and Omaha.134
A. Uncontrolled Gang Violence
Despite laws enacted to curtail gang membership, violent crime has
swelled in Central America. In 2005, El Salvador's homicide rate
increased about twenty-three percent above 2004 levels. In that period,
Honduras and Guatemala had similar increases in the homicide rate.
Indeed, in 2004, Honduras had a murder rate of forty-six persons per
100,000 people, El Salvador had a rate of forty-one persons per 100,000
people, and Guatemala had a rate of thirty-five persons per 100,000 peo-
ple.' 3 5 In 2005, Honduras's murder rate increased to 59.6 persons per
100,000 people, El Salvador's murder rate increased to 59.9, and Guate-
mala's murder rate increased to forty-seven. In aggregate numbers, Gua-
temala had 2655 murders in 1999, and, by 2006, Guatemala had 5885
murders. 136 "[T]he violence.., has been increasing since the mano dura
plan has been established."' 137 As one analyst described these murder
rates, El Salvador and Guatemala both claim "the dubious distinction of
being high on the top-ten list" of intentional homicide rates. 138 Similarly,
in El Salvador, extortion and kidnapping have reached record levels. 139
Thus, the harsh laws did not abate the crime rate in Central America but
did create prison overcrowding, 4 ° which has created chaos within
prisons.
In regard to havoc inside Central American prisons, in El Salva-
dor's La Esperanza prison, thirty-one inmates died in a battle between
Mara 18 members and other inmates. 4 ' La Esperanza does not stand
alone. In August 2005, MS-13 inmates planned an attack against Mara
18 inmates across several Guatemalan prisons. 142 The gang used hand
grenades in its first attack.143 Thirty-five Mara 18 inmates died."44 Dur-
ing the seventeen months that Honduras arrested 1500 tattooed youths,
133. See Michele McPhee, ICE Aims To Freeze Gangs, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 10, 2007, at 7.
134. Lynn Safranek, Arrests Aimed at Dismantling Gang, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 24,
2007, at IA.
135. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 24.
136. Benftez, supra note 129.
137. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 67 (testimony of Manuel Orozco,
Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue) (emphasis added).
138. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 41 (prepared statement of Lainie Reisman,
Director, Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence).
139. Hector Tobar, Salvadoran Gangs Push Violence to Record Level, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2007, at A 16.
140. See discussion supra Part II.C.
141. Mary Jordan, Central America's Gang Crisis, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2004, at Al.
142. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 26.
143. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 34.
144. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 26.
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200 died in prison fires.145 In May of 2004, "103 prisoners, most of them
gang-members, died when fire swept through a grossly overcrowded
prison in San Pedro Sula."' 46 In fact, in 2005, Salvadoran prisons aver-
aged two or three gang-member deaths each day.' 47 Obviously, such
chaotic administration of a prison system cannot properly control
inmates. As a result, in October of 2005, sixteen gang members escaped
Salvadoran prisons.' 48 While Central America's repressive laws inun-
date Central America's prisons, the laws have had little effect on
preventing crime. Thus, the reactionary response of Central American
governments seems to have created new problems by hindering the Cen-
tral American nation's prison systems.
Furthermore, Central America's prison problem encouraged the
gangs "to reorganize themselves, regroup into more violent organiza-
tions."' 49 In San Pedro Sula, Honduras, MS-13 members stopped a bus
and used a machinegun on the passengers. Twenty-eight people died.
Brazenly, the gang members left a letter warning the President of Hon-
duras.' 5 ° This letter indicated that the gang slaughtered the riders in
retaliation for Honduras's laws.15' Since then, MS-13 has clearly taken
responsibility for the bus massacre. 5 As a further highlight of the over-
all prison problem, Lester Rivera-Paz, a participant in the massacre,' 53
had previously escaped from a Honduran prison. 54 With such bold tac-
tics, the argument that the mano dura has thwarted the Central American
gangs seems flimsy.
The surging crime and overpopulated prisons apparently convinced
the Central American nations that the mano dura plan could not, alone,
eradicate the gang problem. For instance, in November of 2005, Manuel
Zelaya won Honduras's presidential election.' Zelaya argued that end-
ing poverty and unemployment would stymie gang violence, and he sup-
145. Walker, supra note 103.
146. After the Massacre, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, at 36, 36.
147. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 26.
148. Id.
149. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 67 (testimony of Manuel Orozco,
Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue).
150. After the Massacre, supra note 146, at 36.
151. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 21 (prepared statement of Chris
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
152. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 42 (prepared statement of Lainie Reisman,
Director, Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence).
153. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 25 (prepared statement of John P.
Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Human Smuggling and Public Safety Division, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
154. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
155. Sam Enniquez & Alex Renderos, In Gang-Plagued Honduras, the Softer Stance Takes the
Presidency, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A3.
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ported job training to combat crime. 5 6 Now, Honduras enforces,
prevents, and rehabilitates in its effort to halt gang violence.157 In 2005,
Honduras established over forty programs directed at gangs, education,
health, occupational training, and housing. 158 These programs reflect the
Central American nations' realization that the high crime rates under-
mine democracy and governmental institutions.
The crime also affects the Central American nations' economies
and faith in democracy. A United Nations' report declared that Central
America's crime creates obstacles to regional investment. 59 One study
estimates that El Salvador's violence costs El Salvador up to fifteen per-
cent of its GDP.'6 ° Another study estimates that violence in El Salvador
cost El Salvador $1.7 billion in 2003.161 One poll found that over eighty
percent of Guatemalan businesses believed crime constrained their busi-
ness. Likewise, sixty-one percent of Honduran businesses agreed that
crime constrained their businesses. Regarding businesses that believed
crime constrained them, no country had a higher percentage than Guate-
mala, and, besides Guatemala, only Kenya had a percentage higher than
Honduras. 62
Salvadoran businesses had a similar view. For example, in El Sal-
vador, eighty percent of the businesses in San Miguel's Chamber of
Commerce and Industry claim to pay extortion taxes to the maras.163
The crime does not only harm businesses, but it also forces the Central
American nations "to channel a disproportionate percentage of their
scarce resources into security."'' This prevents investment in other
projects. 165
In addition, the violence erodes support for democratic govern-
ments in the region. A poll of Latin America found that support for
democracy had the largest drop in El Salvador and Honduras. 166 Moreo-
ver, the populations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras thought
156. Id.
157. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 14 (prepared statement, Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
158. Id.
159. Better Education for Youth Cuts Crime in Central America, supra note 123.
160. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 45 (prepared statement of Lainie Reisman,
Director, Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence).
161. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 24.
162. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 76.
163. Id. at 64.
164. Reisman, supra note 9, at 149.
165. Id. As one analyst noted, "only about 1.5 percent of the region's gross domestic product is
used for education programs, compared to much higher percentages for law enforcement." Better
Education for Youth Cuts Crime in Central America, supra note 123.
166. The Latinobardmetro Poll: A Warning for Reformers, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2007, at 45,
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public order more important than civil liberties. 6 7 In fact, a majority of
Guatemalans favor authoritarian governments to democratic ones. 168
Given the mano dura plans, such a shift in views becomes comprehensi-
ble, though obviously worrisome.
Central Americans also distrust their national institutions. A survey
by the United Nations Development Programme found that Guatemalans
distrust their justice system and police. 169 The same survey indicated
that fifty-nine percent of Guatemalans think it futile to report crimes to
the police.' 7° Honduras contains a similar distrust of the police. Forty-
one percent of Hondurans believe one can bribe a police officer in Hon-
duras. '7 Similarly, forty-five percent of Guatemalans believe one can
bribe a Guatemalan police officer.' Certainly, these rates of crime and
violence have strained the Central American nations' tolerance for
democracy. 73 Thus, Central Americans have a large distrust of their
governments.
This distrust arises from high crime rates, high unemployment, and
an inability to combat crime. With high unemployment and an ineffec-
tive legal infrastructure, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
attempted drastic actions to combat the invading crime. These drastic
actions further undermined democracy by marketing notions of security
above notions of civil liberties. This opposition to democracy undoubt-
edly leads to precariousness in a critical region. Finally, the Central
American nations could not halt the violence and crime through mano
dura.
B. Harm to the United States
Obviously, the United States' removal policy harms Central
America more than it harms the United States. Unlike the Central Amer-
ican nations, the United States has a working legal system, has function-
ing enforcement agencies, and lacks the abject poverty that afflicts El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Still, the United States' policy also
haris the United Statcs. Specifically, the Unitel States' removal policy
has helped create an international gang with strong ties throughout the
167. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 79 ("[T]he Central American
countries (with the exception of Panama and Nicaragua) . . . prioritise public order over civil
liberties, in contrast with the rest of Latin America .... ").
168. The Latinobar6metro Poll: A Warning for Reformers, supra note 166, at 45.
169. Benitez, supra note 129.
170. Id.
171. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 3, at 30 fig.13.
172. Id.
173. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 9 (testimony of Adolfo Franco,
Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for
International Development).
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United States. In addition, since Central America links the drug-produc-
ing countries of South America to the drug-consuming United States, the
gangs in Central America become hired muscle for drug cartels. Hence,
beyond causing crime, entrenching poverty, and undermining democ-
racy in Central America, the United States' removal policy fuels the
United States' gang and drug problems.
MS-13 has influence in the United States. According to the Depart-
ment of Justice, the United States has about 21,500 gangs and 730,000
gang members.174 The MS-13, while only one of those gangs, has cre-
ated a name for itself. MS-13 exists in 31 states.1 75 In the United States,
MS-13 traffics cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin. 1
76
MS-13 also murders, rapes, extorts, steals cars, smuggles aliens, and
launders money. 177 In fact, in Los Angeles, extortion constitutes the pri-
mary crime of both MS-13 and 18th Street.' 78
Beyond this criminal activity, MS-13 also has a propensity for
gruesome violence, even in the United States. While not as brutal as the
bus slaughter in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, 79 MS-13's affinity for vio-
lence appears in the United States as well as in Central America. In
September of 2007, MS-13 shot a merchant who refused to pay MS-13's
fifty-dollar extortion fee.' 8° A stray bullet from that incident killed a
twenty-three-day-old baby.' 8 ' In Dallas, MS-13 members robbed, shot,
and sodomized an innocent young man. MS-13 female members
befriended the victim, Javier Calzada, and asked him for a ride. The ride
was a ploy, which MS-13 used to assault and murder Calzada. 82 In Vir-
ginia, MS-13 gang members used machetes to hack a rival gang mem-
ber.' 83 Other MS-13 members hacked and killed a seventeen-year-old
who was four-months pregnant.'84 The gang members stabbed her six-
teen times.' 85 Authorities accused another alleged MS-13 member of
stabbing a woman forty times, carving MS-13's insignia into her body,
174. NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASs'NS, supra note 16, at ix.
175. Id. at 8-9.
176. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 18 (testimony of Chris Swecker,
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
177. Id. at 21 (prepared statement of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
178. Ari B. Bloomekatz, Sad Price of Gang 'Rent,' L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at BI.
179. See After the Massacre, supra note 146, at 36.
180. Bloomekatz, supra note 178.
181. Id.
182. Kraul et a]., supra note 42.
183. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 22 (testimony of John P. Torres,
Deputy Assistant Director, Human Smuggling and Public Safety Division, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
184. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
185. Id.
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and leaving her body on a sidewalk.' 86 Clearly, MS-13 has the will to
perform heinous, violent crimes. This propensity, along with MS-13's
international connections, makes MS-13 a dangerous organization.
Not only does the United States' removal policy "play a major role
in the gang culture in Central America," '87 but the policy also made MS-
13 and other gangs international phenomena. First, the United States'
removal policy clearly created ties between gang members in the United
States and those removed to Central America. Second, because removed
Central Americans travel through Mexico on their way to the United
States, the gangs have spread into Mexico and have begun smuggling
aliens and drugs.
Since many of the removed youths lived in the United States their
entire childhood and know little Spanish,' 88 the removal policy gives
incentives for those removed youths to return to the United States.
Indeed, "[a]ccording to Salvadoran police, 90 percent of deported gang
members return to the [United] States as fast as they can."' 8 9 One survey
discovered that thirty-eight percent of all removed Salvadorans planned
to return to the United States. 190 Twenty-three percent indicated that the
United States had deported them at least once before. 91 "It is not at all
uncommon for a deported gang member, having benefited from newly
established links to the drugs, weapons, and other criminal networks in
Central America, to make his way back to the United States within a
matter of months." 192 In one notorious case, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Border Patrol caught an MS-13 leader wanted
by Honduran authorities. 193 The MS-13 leader had ties to a Los Angeles
clique of MS-13, and the United States had removed him four times
before.' 94 The MS-13 does not confine its activities to the United States
and Central America but, increasingly, acts in Mexico as well.
186. John Stevenson, Jury: Honduran Guilty of Murder, HERALD-SUN (Durham), Oct. 20,
2007, at C1.
187. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 17 (prepared statement of Charles Shapiro,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of
State).
188. See Reisman, supra note 9, at 149.
189. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 44 (prepared statement of Stephen
C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
190. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 49 (statement of Nestor Rodriguez, Ph.D.,
Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of Houston). Twenty-eight percent did not
answer that question. Id.
191. Id. at 49-50.
192. Reisman, supra note 9, at 149.
193. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 21 (prepared statement of prepared
statement of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
194. See Kraul et al., supra note 42.
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Regarding the growing connection with Mexico, the Mexican state
of Chiapas began a campaign against MS-13.'95 Chiapas began the cam-
paign as a response to robberies committed by MS-13 members against
migrants traveling through Mexico.' 96 MS-13 also has a presence in
Mexican border towns.197 Additionally, MS-13 has an infrastructure that
allows different cliques to communicate. This communications infra-
structure arose partly from the prisons of Central America. With over-
crowded, understaffed, and ineffective prisons, the Central American
nations abdicated control of the prisons to the gangs. The FBI has char-
acterized the Central American prisons as "college for MS-13."' '98 And
Beat Rohr of the United Nations Development Programme said, "The
jails are nothing more than schools of crime."'199 Because of the Central
American nations' inability to prevent fights between rival gang mem-
bers, Salvadoran officials placed all MS-13 members in Ciudad Barrios
and one other prison.2° Such a concentration of allied gang members
had a negative impact. One study found that, while originally unstruc-
tured, the number of arrests and duration of arrests in Central America
allowed "gang members from cliques around [Central America to] ...
create rudimentary national structures [used] for co-ordination between
different cliques."2 °
Now, partly because of the Central American prisons, MS-13 cli-
ques have contacts and ties with other cliques around the world and
around the United States. For example, members in the Washington,
D.C. area pay dues, which occasionally go to MS-13 members in El
Salvador.2" 2 As another example, MS-13 leaders in El Salvador have
sent other members to run MS-13 enterprises in Maryland.2"3 Similarly,
MS-13 leaders imprisoned in El Salvador have ordered murder hits in
Maryland.2 °4 In another case, an MS-13 leader imprisoned in Texas
wrote a letter to an MS-13 clique in Virginia. That letter revealed a
woman's status as federal informant. 2 5 The MS-13 clique murdered the
195. Id.
196. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 44-45 (prepared statement of
Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation).
197. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
198. Lopez et al., supra note 43.
199. Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 26.
200. Lopez et al., supra note 43.
201. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 51 (prepared statement of Geoff Thale,
Program Director, Washington Office on Latin America).
202. Lopez et al., supra note 43.
203. Castaneda, supra note 132.
204. Ruben Castaneda, MS-13 Case Adds Salvadoran Inmates, WASH. POST, June 6, 2007, at
B6.
205. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
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informant.20 6 Thus, unlike normal gangs, MS-13 cliques now communi-
cate with each other.
MS-13's willingness to communicate with different cliques, along
with Central America's geographic location between the drug-producing
countries of South America and the drug-consuming United States, have
raised concerns about MS-13 and the drug trade. Over half of the
cocaine destined for the United States travels through Central America
and Mexico. 2 7 Guatemala, for example, is "a major transshipment and
storage point for South American drugs en route to the United States."208
El Salvador and Honduras face similar drug transactions.20 9 With such
opportunities, the maras, while not in charge of drug trafficking, have
begun to capitalize on the drug trade. The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) discovered connections at high
levels between Central American gang members and organized drug
traffickers.21 0 One Mexican, organized-crime prosecutor has noted the
increasing involvement of the Central American gangs in the Mexican
drug trade.2 1 In Honduras, drug trafficking sits on both 18th Street's
and MS-13's top five most frequently committed crimes.212 While the
gangs do not currently control the drug trade in Central America, they
"are the future drug traffickers, and they are far worse than anything that
[the Drug Enforcement Administration is] confronting today. ' 213 Con-
sidering the Central American nation's inability to combat the gangs, a
growing relationship between those gangs and organized narco-traffick-
ers causes only worry.
The Central American gangs also play a role in the smuggling of
aliens. In Honduras, 18th Street's most frequently committed crime con-
sists of trafficking persons.214 The Central American "gangs are astride
alien smuggling routes in Central America and Mexico.11215 Worried of
206. Id.
207. The Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 17 (2005) [hereinafter The Illicit
Drug T ....sit , p-r . se of Michael oe Braun, Chief ofOperations, U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration).
208. Id. at 19.
209. See id. at 20.
210. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 6 (prepared statement of Jos6 Guillermo
Castillo Villacorta, Ambassador of Guatemala to the United States).
211. Richard Marosi, Mexico's Cartels Escalate Drug War, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.
212. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 12 (prepared statement of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
213. The Illicit Drug Transit Zone, supra note 207, at 39 (testimony of Michael A. Braun,
Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration).
214. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 12 (prepared statement of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
215. The Illicit Drug Transit Zone, supra note 207, at 9 (testimony of Jonathan D. Farrar,
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the gang's role in alien smuggling, the Mexican state of Chiapas enacted
a plan to share intelligence with the FBI regarding MS-13's use of rail-
ways to smuggle aliens.2 16 MS-13 members act as guides and charge
$1500 to bring illegal aliens into the United States.217 In turn, the gangs
use some of these illegal aliens to sell drugs on the streets of the United
States.218
In total, the United States' policy created an international gang with
the capability of communicating across different nations. This gang now
has grown bonds in the drug and illegal-alien trade. While the United
States clearly has the resources to combat the MS-13 now, the battle
against these international gangs will continue so long as the United
States follows its current policy.
IV. CURRENT LAW CANNOT MITIGATE THE PROBLEM
Central America is relatively close to the United States, the United
States has a significant Central American population, 2 9 and many of
those removed have lived exclusively in the United States.220 Therefore,
many removed Central American gang members still have connections
to the United States. 2 Simple removal of Central American gang mem-
bers does little to halt the re-immigration of those same felons and cre-
ates incentives for Central Americans to enter the United States.
A. Continuation of the Same Policy, and Courts'
Refusal To Grant Asylum
The United States continues to use the expanded definition of
"aggravated felony" and continues to bar relief for aliens who commit-
ted an "aggravated felony. '222 Furthermore, the United States' rate of
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
U.S. Department of State).
216. Kraul et al., supra note 42.
217. Id.
218. See Criminal Gangs in the Americas: Out of the Underworld, supra note 18, at 26 (noting
that, in Los Angeles, the gangs make aliens whom they brought into the United States illegally sell
drugs).
219. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2006, at 4
tbl.3 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill-pe-2006.
pdf. About 510,000 illegal aliens came from El Salvador, while 430,000 came from Guatemala,
and 280,000 came from Honduras. Id.
220. See Reisman, supra note 9, at 149.
221. See Ruben Castaneda, Teen Linked to MS-13 Convicted in Killing, WASH. POST, June 23,
2007, at B4 (noting that gang leaders in Salvadoran prisons ordered gang members in Maryland to
murder and commit other crimes).
222. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ l101(a)(43), 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), (iii) (West 2007).
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alien removal to Central America has continuously increased.2 23 But this
policy simply helps sustain the above-mentioned problems. Moreover,
barring the Attorney General's consent to the alien's reapplication for
admission, any alien removed based on an aggravated felony is inadmis-
sible to the United States.224 And, again, this change came about through
the lIRIR.
22 5
Furthermore, under current law, cancelling removal is a difficult
task. If the United States finds an alien removable, eligibility to cancel
the removal requires that the alien, if she has permanent legal resident
status, have resided seven continuous years in the United States.226 For
an alien who is not a permanent legal resident, eligibility for cancellation
requires ten years of continuous residence. 227 As changed by IIRIR, cur-
rent immigration law "'stops' an alien's accrual of continuous presence
in the United States at the time that he commits a crime. '228 The "con-
tinuous" aspect is critical. For example, in one case, the alien had good
moral character, showed that a parent would face extreme and unusual
hardship if the United States removed her, and had lived in the United
States for over ten years. 229 But, because the alien had left the United
States for five months, she had not resided continuously as required by
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A).23 ° Indeed, for a nonpermanent resident to continu-
ously reside within the United States, the alien cannot leave the United
States for more than ninety days.23' More severely, anyone charged with
an "aggravated felony" cannot seek removal. 232 "Nor is an aggravated
felon eligible for asylum. '"233
Beyond cancellation of removal, aliens can seek asylum. But the
United States refuses to recognize asylum claims by young Central
Americans who fear gangs. For an alien to qualify for asylum, the alien
must be a refugee 4.2 3 Thus, to gain eligibility for asylum, the alien must
223. For example, the United States removed around 12,000 Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and
Hondurans in 2001. INS, supra note 78, at 257 tbl.65. In 2003, the number of removed
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans increased to 19,000. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, supra note 79. at 173 tbl.43. In 2006, the number had swollen to 55,000. Deportees in
Latin America, supra note 17, at 13 (prepared statement of Gary Mead, Assistant Director for
Management, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), (iii) (2000).
225. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575 to -576 (1996).
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2000).
227. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
228. Valencia-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 2006).
229. Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
230. Id. at 1146-47, 1149.
231. Id. at 1149.
232. Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625, 628 (2006).
233. Id.
234. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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have "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion. '  Here, the first inquiry consists of whether an alien has a well-
founded fear of persecution, while the second inquiry asks whether the
fear of persecution arises from one of the five stated reasons.
To prove a well-founded fear of persecution, "an applicant must
demonstrate a fear that is both subjectively genuine and objectively rea-
sonable. ' '23 6 Due to this subjective element, a probability of persecution
need not exist for an alien to gain asylum.237 In regard to the subjective
aspect, youths who faced prior threats by the Central American gangs or
who belonged to the Central American gangs can easily prove a well-
founded fear. For instance, in one case, a sixteen-year-old Guatemalan
fled his country after a gang threatened him and his cousin.238 The gang
had previously killed the alien's brother for refusing to join the gang,
and, eventually, the gang killed the alien's cousin for refusing to join the
gang. 239 The Immigration Judge found the alien had a well-founded fear
of persecution, and the Board of Immigration Appeals "did not disturb
his holding. '2 40 However, this subjective sense of persecution does not
suffice to show all aspects of persecution necessary to obtain asylum.
To obtain asylum, an alien must show that the persecution comes
from the government or comes from the government's inability to pro-
tect the alien from the persecutor.24 ' Hence, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to decide whether aliens who had testified against gangs
in their native lands constituted a particular social group, because the
alien could not show that the persecution arose from'El Salvador's
actions or inactions.242 Even though nationals of Honduras distrust their
police force and Central American police forces have paltry crime-solv-
ing rates, one court held that, because the alien did not report her rape by
a gang member, the alien could not show "that the government of Hon-
duras is unable or unwilling to control rape in that country. 2 4 3 In a
235. Id. § 1101(a)(42).
236. Cigaran v. Heston, 159 F.3d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987)).
237. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 ("One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an
event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.").
238. Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2004).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 234.
241. Id. ("[T]o qualify for asylum, one must show: (1) a well-founded fear of persecution ...
by an organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control." (emphasis added)); see
also Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the
persecution is caused by the government or by forces the government is "unable or unwilling" to
dominate).
242. Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2007).
243. Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).
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similar case, a court upheld an Immigration Judge's decision that no
persecution existed, because the police arrested the gang member who
harassed and threatened the alien who sought asylum.24 Of course, at
times, Immigration Judges do hold that governments cannot control their
native gangs.245 Still, even if an alien proves that she faces persecution
at the hand of uncontrolled gangs, aliens must also show that the alien
has "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."246 Likely due to the difficulty of selling any persecution by gangs
based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, most cases
argue that the maras persecute because of an alien's particular social
group.248
Under current asylum law, to show membership in a particular
social group, an alien "must (1) specify the particular social group, (2)
show that he is a member of that group, and (3) show that he has a well-
founded fear of persecution based on his membership in that group. 2 49
"[D]efining what constitutes such a group for purposes of the [Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act] remains elusive and inconsistent. '25 ° Still,
under current interpretation, courts refuse to recognize innocent children
who fear gangs in Central America as a particular social group. For
example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize street
children as a particular social group in a case where gangs harassed,
stole, and physically abused one child.251 Indeed, the court stated that
"the persecution cannot be what defines the contours of the [particular
social] group. 252
244. Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2005).
245. See Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 235 (asserting that the immigration judge found that
Guatemala could not protect its citizens from the maras).
246. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
247. In two recent cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals refused to grant Honduran and
Salvadoran aliens asylum based on their political opinions. Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
591, 596 (2008); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 588-89 (2008). Both times, the Board of
Immigration Appeals underscored that no nexus existed betwccn the aliens' refusal to join the
gangs, the gangs' violent reprisals, and the aliens' political beliefs. Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 597; Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 589.
248. See, e.g., Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (deciding whether
Central American street children persecuted by gangs constituted a particular social group);
Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 920 (stating alien argued that the gang persecuted her based on a particular
social group); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding whether
former gang members constituted a particular social group upon which an alien could seek
asylum).
249. Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d. at 235 (emphasis added).
250. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 546.
251. Escobar, 417 F.3d at 364.
252. Id. at 367; see also Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) ("We agree
that under the [law] a 'particular social group' must exist independently of the persecution
suffered by the applicant for asylum.").
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Even where courts recognize membership in a particular social
group, the courts have shown reluctance to recognize that the perse-
cuting gang's actions resulted because of the particular social group.
Courts have recognized groups such as "family" as particular social
groups, but those courts have refused to find that the alien's familial
membership caused the gangs to target the alien. For example, in Lopez-
Soto v. Ashcroft, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized "fam-
ily" as a "particular social group," but upheld the immigration judge's
refusal to find the necessary link between the group and the gang's per-
secution. 3 The court upheld the refusal to find the necessary link
despite the gang's previous murder of the alien's brother for refusing to
join the gang and despite the gang's threats to the alien that, if he did not
join, the gang would kill him.254
Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals shattered any asylum
hopes that innocent victim of the maras held. In two cases, the Board of
Immigration Appeals refused the argument that innocent victims who
feared the gangs composed a particular social group. In the first case,
Matter of S-E-G-, three Salvadoran aliens requested asylum and indi-
cated that the MS- 13 had beaten them and threatened them with violence
and rape. 5 The Salvadoran aliens argued that they belonged to a partic-
ular social group: "Salvadoran youth[s] who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted member-
ship in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious oppo-
sition to the gang's values. 1 5 6 In Matter of S-E-G-, a case of first
impression,257 the Board of Immigration Appeals noted that a particular
social group demands well-defined boundaries and a certain level of
social visibility.258 The Board of Immigration Appeals refused the
aliens' argument for two reasons.
First, although the aliens sought to limit the group to male, lower-
to middle-class children who lacked stable families, lived in mara-con-
trolled areas, and refused recruitment, the Board of Immigration Appeals
somehow found the group's boundaries amorphous. Thus, Salvadoran
youths who refused to join MS-13 lacked particularity and did not con-
stitute a particular social group. Highlighting a more credible argument,
the Board of Immigration Appeals also reasoned that this group lacked
particularity because "the motivation of gang members in recruiting and
253. 383 F.3d at 231 & n.3, 239.
254. Id.
255. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579-80 (2008).
256. Id. at 581.
257. See id. at 582 ("We have not previously addressed whether ... Salvadoran youths who
have resisted gang recruitment ... constitute[ ] a 'particular social group ... .
258. Id.
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targeting young males could arise from motivations quite apart from any
perception that the males in question were members of a class.
259
Second, unwilling to dismiss the argument merely on particularity
grounds, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Salvadoran
youths who refuse recruitment also lack social visibility.26° With bizarre
logic, the Board of Immigration Appeals underscored that gang violence
engulfs all of El Salvador. Since gang violence terrorized all
Salvadorans, Salvadorans could not differentiate the general terror with
the terror inflicted upon youths who refuse to join gangs.26' Chaos is
chaos, and terror is terror. The extra danger involved in refusing to join a
gang does not suffice to make one stand apart from the general chaos in
Central America.
The second case mimicked Matter of S-E-G-. Dealing with a Hon-
duran who feared gang reprisal for his refusal to join a gang, the Board
of Immigration of Appeals in Matter of E-A-G- also refused to grant a
Central American youth asylum.262 An immigration judge found the
Honduran eligible for asylum, holding that he fell within a particular
social group. The Honduran, the immigration judge held, belonged to
youths perceived to be affiliated with gangs. 263 The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals disagreed and held that "[t]reating affiliation with a crimi-
nal organization as being protected membership in a social group is
inconsistent with the principles underlying the bars to asylum ... based
on criminal behavior. ' '264 Unfortunately for the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the Honduran never involved himself in any gang activity. The
Board of Immigration Appeals worried not. For the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, since "membership in a criminal gang cannot constitute a
particular social group," the Honduran could not "establish particular
social group status based on the incorrect perception by others that he is
such a gang member. '265 Never does the Board of Immigration Appeals
notice that the logic behind preventing actual ex-criminals from claim-
ing asylum fails when a person is merely perceived as a criminal but has
actually committed no wrong. Regardless, the Board of Immigration
Appeals refused to grant asylum.
Clearly, the courts take harsher positions when the United States
seeks to remove an alien for convictions and that alien seeks asylum. In
one case, a Salvadoran permanent resident sought withholding of
259. Id. at 585.
260. Id. at 588.
261. See id. at 587.
262. 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591-92, 598 (2008).
263. Id. at 591-92.
264. Id. at 596.
265. Id.
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removal, arguing "that because he [was] marked with indelible tattoos
indicating his gang membership [he] may therefore be persecuted by
rival gang members if returned to his home country. 26 6 The alien
sought to define the group as United States gang members, but the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his claim.267 Actually, the court stated
that one should not "become misled by expansive and abstract defini-
tions of the term 'social group' to the extent that the application of such
a definition fails to comport with the manifest legislative purpose of the
law and its language. 268 Similarly, another court refused to accept "tat-
tooed youths" as a social group to which it could grant asylum.269 The
court stated that, while "social group" was a flexible concept, "it is also
apparent that the term cannot be without some outer limit, outside of
which tattooed youth surely falls. '27 ° Thus, considering this legal land-
scape, few aliens who sincerely fear persecution from gangs can obtain
asylum.
The courts refuse to grant asylum to children who fear returning to
Central America. Since withholding has a higher burden than asylum, 271
courts do not grant withholding either. As such, the government removes
young aliens who fear that Central American gangs will conscript them.
These new conscripts have ties to the United States, bolstering the links
between the Central American gangs and the United States.
The United States has a nonsensical policy. Asylum claims filed by
young Central Americans suggest that gangs respond to refusals of gang
membership with threats and violence.272 Gangs use coercion for recruit-
ment purposes, and "some gangs may be so intimidating that for non-
members to fail to claim membership is perceived as dangerous. '"273
Therefore, the United States' policy only removes an avenue of escape
for Central Americans who refuse joining the maras. Linked with the
economic pressures of unemployment, the physical pressures exerted by
266. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2007).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
270. Id.
271. Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 239 n.14 (4th Cir. 2004).
272. See, e.g., Bautista v. Keisler, 249 F. App'x 488, 489 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (noting
gangs attempted to force alien into gang); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 502 F.3d 285,
286 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the mara threatened to kill the youth if he did not join the gang);
Lopez-Monterroso v. Gonzales, 236 F. App'x 207, 208 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that alien was
allegedly threatened and beaten by gangs for his refusal to join); Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
363, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting the gangs threatened street children with violence if they refused
to join); Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 231-32 (noting that gang threatened youth with death if he did
not join the gang).
273. James, supra note 5, at 4.
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the Central American gangs on the removed youths only creates recruits
and conscripts for the maras.
B. Creating Incentives for Illegal Immigration
Beyond creating an international drug and alien smuggling organi-
zations, and beyond failing to prevent crime's stronghold in the United
States, the United States' removal policy creates incentives for Central
Americans to migrate illegally to the United States. Already facing over-
whelming indigence, underemployment, and unemployment, the rising
crime can only create further reasons for the trek to the United States. In
that sense, the United States' current removal policy counteracts any
efforts by the United States to control illegal migration.
Concerning illegal immigration from Central America to the United
States, the INS estimated that 335,000 Salvadoran nationals lived ille-
gally within the United States as of October of 1996.274 By 2000,
430,000 Salvadorans lived in the United States illegally.275 By 2006,
510,000 Salvadorans lived in the United States illegally.
27 6
Guatemalan and Honduran migration follows a similar pattern. As
of October 1996, 165,000 Guatemalans resided inside the United States
illegally, while 90,000 Hondurans did the same.277 By 2000, the number
had shifted to 290,000 Guatemalans and 160,000 Hondurans living
inside the United States illegally. As of 2006, 430,000 Guatemalans live
in the United States illegally, while 280,000 Hondurans do likewise.
Indeed, while the number of illegal immigrants in the United States
increased by thirty-seven percent between 2000 and 2006, the number of
illegal Guatemalans in the United States increased by forty-eight per-
cent, and the number of illegal Hondurans in the United States increased
by seventy-five percent.278 The yearly rate of illegal immigration has
also increased. For example, in 1992, an estimated 28,000 Central
Americans migrated without authorization to the United States.279 By
1999, the number of Central Americans that migrated to the United
States without authorization grew to 82,000.280
The data suggest a growing wave of illegal immigration to the
274. INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1995 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 183 tbl.P (1997).
275. HOEFER ET AL., supra note 219, at 4 tbl.3.
276. Id.
277. INS, supra note 274, at 183 tbl.P.
278. HOEFER ET AL., supra note 219, at 4 tbl.3.
279. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S. INS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, at 13 chart 3 (2001),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lllReport_1211 .pdf.
280. Id.
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United States from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. While
impossible to point at one factor causing the increase in illegal migration
to the United States, common sense dictates that the increasing gang
crime in Central America helped increase the flow of illegal migration.
Indeed, the mayor of San Salvador recognized, "And now we have
youths fleeing from El Salvador because of the gangs. ' '281 As economic
opportunities diminish and violence increases, people will have more
reasons to migrate. If the United States seeks to alleviate illegal migra-
tion from Central America, it must partially focus on the gang violence
that grips El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As of 2008, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras lack the
resources to incarcerate all the gangs, to combat the illegal-drug trade, or
to rehabilitate ex-gang members. Hence, no simple solution exists. Fore-
most, however, the United States must rethink its current removal
policy.
A. Current Efforts To Help the Central American Nations
Recently, the United States has undergone efforts to undermine the
Central American gangs in the United States. For instance, in 2005, ICE
began Operation Community Shield, which attempt to enforce immigra-
tion laws against gang members.282 The operation sought to "dismantle
the MS-13. '283 Federal agencies arrested 1053 illegal aliens in the three
months prior to October of 2007 through Operation Community
Shield.284 The operation snatched 204 MS-13 members in Boston.285
MS-13 constituted the gang who lost the most members to arrest in the
national operation. 286 Likewise, the FBI created an MS-13 National
Gang Task force to coordinate different enforcement agencies and take
action against the gang.287
281. Hendricks, supra note 11.
282. Beth Walton, Gang Suspects Arrested, Face Deportation, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Oct. 10,
2007, at 7B.
283. Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 32 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
284. Walton, supra note 282.
285. McPhee, supra note 133.
286. Bloomekatz, supra note 131.
287. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 21 (prepared statement of Chris
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
Along with Customs and Border Patrol, the MS-13 National Gang Task Force arrested Lester
Rivera-Paz, who involved himself in the notorious bus massacre in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. See
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While the United States has taken domestic action to combat the
Central American gangs, it has done minimal work in helping combat
the Central American gangs' international trait. The United States has
begun to assist Central America in law enforcement, but it has done little
to help the Central American nations in gang prevention and rehabilita-
tion. Indeed, one commentator noted, "The national budgets for [gang]
prevention activities in Central America are virtually nonexistence [sic],
and our own development assistance in this area is minimal. 288 Still, the
United States does give some aid. For example, the United States helps
fund the International Institute for Law Enforcement in El Salvador. An
academy, the International Institute for Law Enforcement mainly trains
police agents and prosecutors. 289 The United States has also attempted to
improve the information received by the nations to which the United
States removes aliens. For example, the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity created a system that provides biographical information on removed
aliens in Guatemala and plans to expand it to El Salvador and Hondu-
ras. 29° The FBI and Department of State want to help train Central
American law enforcers to acquire fingerprints of gang members. Theo-
retically, the fingerprints would create a database in which the United
States and the Central American nations could share gang informa-
tion.29 Furthermore, individual U.S. law-enforcement agencies now
work with law-enforcement agencies in Central America to combat the
gangs.292
While the United States has recently increased its law-enforcement
interaction with Central America, one should not overestimate the suc-
cess of these programs. For example, in the first three years, the law
academy trained forty-eight Honduran enforcement professionals.293
id. at 23-24 (testimony of John P. Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Human Smuggling and
Public Safety Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security).
288. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 40 (statement of Lainie Reisman, Director,
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence).
289. Id. at 9 (statement of Roberto Flores Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United
States).
290. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 16 (prepared statement of Charles Shapiro,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of
State).
291. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, app. at 75 (statement of the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs of the U.S. Department of State).
292. See, e.g., Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 23 (testimony of John P.
Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Human Smuggling and Public Safety Division, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) ("ICE maintains
a close working relationship with Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala in the exchange
of intelligence pertaining to MS-13 and other gang activity.").
293. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 29 (testimony of Roberto Flores Bermudez,
Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
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That hardly constitutes a law enforcement hub that will change enforce-
ment practices throughout Central America. Furthermore, while the
United States attempted to provide removed aliens' biographical infor-
mation, 94 the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that it
only provided the Central American nations records concerning the
crime for which the Department of Homeland Security removed the
alien.2 95 Moreover, the United States has done little to help the Central
American nations prevent, rehabilitate, or cement the rule of law.
Since the United States offers little aid in prevention and rehabilita-
tion, some of the Central American nations' prevention and rehabilita-
tion programs have small budgets. For example, the Honduras Institute
of Youth, which attempts to rehabilitate ex-gang members, had an
annual budget of $756,000 in 2006; Honduras's program for "Preven-
tion, Rehabilitation and Social Reinsertion of Persons Belonging to
Gangs" had a budget of $329,000 that same year; and Honduras had an
annual budget of $286,000 to build recreational centers for youths.29 6
Nor do the Central American nations receive aid to bolster the rule of
law. Only about five percent of the United States' aid to Latin America
goes to fortifying justice systems.297 International aid falters equally. For
example, the World Bank allocated less than one percent of all develop-
ment assistance sent to Latin America in 2001 to increase the rule of
law. 98 Thus, neither the United States nor international organizations
help bolster rehabilitation or the rule of law in the Central American
nations.
B. Amending the Immigration Laws
The United States' removal policy created startling consequences.
These consequences harm interests both at home and abroad. As such,
no single solution can renormalize all of Central America, end gang vio-
lence, and undermine gang influence in the United States. Any solution
includes increasing law-enforcement cooperation with Central America,
as well as increasing funding to prevention programs. The Central
American nations must end the virulent underemployment and unem-
294. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 16 (prepared statement of Charles Shapiro,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of
State).
295. Id. at 24-26 (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant Director for Management, Office of
Detention and Removal Operations, Bureau of U.S. Immigration and Customs Management, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security).
296. Violence in Central America, supra note 8, at 33-34 (testimony of Roberto Flores
Bermudez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States).
297. Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 70 (testimony of Manuel Orozco,
Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue).
298. PRILLAMAN, supra note 106, at 19.
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ployment among the nations' youths. The region also needs a systematic
plan to control the gang violence. Nevertheless, any plan also requires
modifications of the United States' current removal policy.
In an attempt to control the gang violence in Central America,
Human Rights Watch recently asked Congress to return to the immigra-
tion laws before 1996.299 However, politics probably undermines any
solution that keeps criminals in the United States.3"' Still, solutions to
mitigate the problem abound. First, the United States may forego
removal to the Central American nations via bilateral treaties, or, if the
United States finds foregoing removal altogether unpalatable, the United
States may forego removal to the Central American nations in certain
circumstances. Second, the United States need not stop the removal of
violent criminals but may simply seek to amend the definition of "aggre-
gated felony." Also, it may allow relief from removal when the alien has
lived almost exclusively in the United States. Lastly, while a minor solu-
tion, the United States may adjust asylum claims such that youths who
fear persecution at the hands of the maras may get asylum.
In regard to treaties, the United States has the authority to enter
bilateral treaties curtailing removal. Indeed, the United States has previ-
ously entered treaties with nations curtailing the United States' plenary
immigration powers.3"' Hence, the United States has the ability to enter
treaties with nations concerning immigration matters. In fact, the United
States has realized the importance of the Central American region and
entered into treaties with nations in Central America. The United States
has entered treaties with Central American nations regarding common
defense,30 2 technical assistance,30 3 and radio transmissions.304 The
299. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 55 (statement of Allison Parker, Esq.,
Senior Researcher, United States Program, Human Rights Watch).
300. For example, one Congressman stated, "Of course I certainly didn't go to my district and
my community advocating that we bring the prisoners back to my neighborhood. I mean that
wouldn't have gone over too big." Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 37
(statement of Rep. Donald M. Payne, Member, Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H.
Comm. on International Relations).
301. Among the most well-known immigration treaties is a treaty between United States and
China. The treaty prevented the United States from barring the immigration of Chinese laborers
into the United States. Treaty Between the United States and China Concerning Immigration,
U.S.-China, Oct. 5, 1881, 22 Stat. 826. The United States later violated this treaty, causing a
Chinese laborer barred from re-entering the United States to seek a writ of habeas corpus. The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 581-82 (1889). This suit led to the Supreme Court's
holdings that the courts cannot review Congress's decision to exclude aliens. Id. at 602.
302. Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement, U.S.-Hond., May 20, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 843.
303. Agreement for Economic, Technical and Related Assistance, U.S.-El Sal., Dec. 19, 1961,
13 U.S.T. 266.
304. Agreement Relating to the Reciprocal Granting of Authorizations To Permit Licensed
Amateur Radio Operators of Either Country To Operate Their Stations in the Other Country, U.S.-
Guat., Dec. 11, 1967, 20 U.S.T. 2883.
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United States has shown a willingness to help Central American nations
through treaties.3 °5 Moreover, the United States has entered treaties with
some of the Central American nations for security reasons. For example,
the United States entered a treaty with Honduras, in which the United
States and Honduras agreed to combat the illegal-drug trade.3°6 Thus,
the United States has shown a willingness to enter bilateral treaties with
Central American nations, thereby helping the Central American nation
and securing United States interests.
Uniting the United States' willingness to combat violence and drug
trafficking in Central America with the United States' capability of
entering immigration agreements, the United States can viably alter
some of its removal procedures when they concern Salvadorans,
Guatemalans, and Hondurans. Hence, the United States can enter treaties
with the Central American nations to postpone removal until Central
America stabilizes. Alternatively, the United States can craft special
immigration laws for the Central American nations that more easily
grant cancellation of removal. Or the United States can enter agreements
to further regional rehabilitation, prevention, and enforcement programs.
Some may argue that the United States, by entering specific immi-
gration agreements, would show favoritism and would open the gates to
requests by other nations for similar treatment. Such an argument
ignores two aspects of the United States' immigration policies. Initially,
the United States' current immigration policies clearly favor some
nations over others as a matter of foreign policy. Moreover, some of the
United States' policies that have attempted to apply equal policies
among all nations have failed.
Currently, the Visa Waiver Program illustrates the United States'
favoritism in immigration policy. Most tourists must apply to obtain a
visa for pleasure.30 7 But the United States waives such requirements for
nationals of certain countries.30 8 The nations to which the Visa Waiver
Program applies include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom.30 9 The Visa Waiver Program, then, reflects an understanding
of the unlikelihood that tourists from affluent nations will stay in the
United States beyond their visa time limit. Thus, arguing that the United
305. For example, the United States entered an agreement with Guatemala to encourage
investment in Guatemala. Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties, U.S.-Guat., Aug. 9,
1960, 13 U.S.T. 2008.
306. Agreement on Mutual Cooperation To Combat the Production of and Illicit Trafficking in
Drugs, U.S.-Hond., Nov. 14, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 11632.
307. See 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(15)(B), 1201(a) (2000).
308. 8 C.F.R. § 217.2 (2007). Indeed, nationals of twenty-seven nations have such privilege
under the Visa Waiver Program. See id.
309. Id.
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States, by entering agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, or Hondu-
ras indicates favoritism ignores that immigration policy reflects foreign
affairs and domestic preferences.
Additionally, attempts by the United States to create an equally dis-
tributed immigration policy have led to chaotic outcomes. In 1952, Con-
gress placed a ceiling on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere, but
not the Western Hemisphere.31 ° In 1965, Congress placed a ceiling on
immigrants from the Western Hemisphere"' and, thus, created a more
congruent policy. But, "[t]he legislation did not accomplish its goal
regarding Western Hemispher [sic] immigraiton [sic] without substantial
costs. ' 3 12 Indeed, speaking of the legislation, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee noted, "When repealing the national origins quota system, the
89th Congress did not provide an adequate mechanism for implementing
the Western Hemisphere ceiling."3 3 Furthermore, there was "considera-
ble hardship for intending immigrants from this hemisphere who until
1968 enjoyed the privilege of unrestricted immigration." '314 The legisla-
tion had an unbalanced effect.
[I]n the Western Hemisphere spouses and children of permanent resi-
dent aliens, other labor certification-exempt relatives and labor certi-
fied immigrants all waited together in a single list for lengthy periods
of time to immigrate. In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, immi-
grants were admitted within preference categories, under which close
relatives of persons in the United States were generally admitted
expeditiously.3 5
Therefore, even policies that attempt to achieve balance create unbal-
anced outcomes when the policies ignore legitimate differences. Nations
in the Western Hemisphere had closer ties and a closer proximity than
nations in the Eastern Hemisphere. Thus, the United States policy cre-
ated unforeseen problems when it assumed equivalent situations among
the two regions. Similarly, reality here shows that the Central American
nations differ in numerous aspects to other nations. If the United States
ignores these facts, what appears to be a balanced policy will not be.
have noted that, after 1996, the United States removes both vicious
thugs and minor offenders.3 16 For instance, the New York misdemeanor
310. STAFF OF THE SELECT COMM'N, STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 203-04 (1981).
311. Id. at 208.
312. Id. at 209.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 338.
316. See generally Morawetz, supra note 54 (discussing the impact of the 1996 changes to
immigration laws).
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of petty theft, if joined with a one-year sentence, may constitute an
"aggravated felony." '317 Although the removal of such an alien does not
increase the security of the United States, the removal exacerbates the
Central American nations' problem. Aliens who committed misdemean-
ors probably do not export gang tactics and violence to Central America.
Still, removed aliens need not be gang members to join gangs once in El
Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. Among a survey of removed
Salvadorans, the removed Salvadorans reported difficulty finding a job,
and the removed Salvadorans' families complained of the removed
Salvadorans' problematic behavior.318 In an indigent nation, with few
employment options, and with unfamiliarity of their country of origin,
even convicts of misdemeanors may seek to join the maras.
Some may argue that criminal aliens, even criminals that commit
misdemeanors, should be removed. The problem, the argument might
go, belongs to the Central American nations, not the United States. This
argument ignores reality. Beyond the ethical issues of removing people
who have lived in the United States without considering those persons'
families, the removal policy harms the United States' interests. The
United States has the resources to create operations to take down notori-
ous and dangerous gang members,319 while the Central American
nations can only pass laws that outlaw any youth with a tattoo. 320 The
United States can imprison law violators; 321 the Central American
nations cannot.322 The current policy closely imitates this purported
solution. Not only has this policy caused more violence in Central
America, but it has created connections between gangs in the United
States and gangs in Central America. Therefore, the current policy wors-
ens the problem. As such, the United States must aid Central America in
terms of law enforcement, crime prevention, and rehabilitation. Without
it, what appeared a violent but distant threat might become a recalcitrant,
entrenched organization causing the United States problems in drug traf-
ficking, illegal migration, and crime.
Lastly, the United States may attempt to stymie this problem
through asylum claims. The United States may change federal regula-
tions so that courts uphold asylum claims by Central American youths
317. Id. at 1939.
318. Deportees in Latin America, supra note 17, at 51 (prepared statement of Nestor
Rodriguez, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of Houston).
319. See Walton, supra note 282.
320. See Walker, supra note 103.
321. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 12, at 23-24 (prepared statement of
Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) (noting that the United States would imprison Lester Paz-Rivera before sending him
back to Honduras).
322. See Jordan, supra note 141.
[Vol. 63:301
2008] REMOVAL OF CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG MEMBERS 337
with legitimate fear of gang violence or reprisal in their native lands.
Under current law, courts clearly cannot grant asylum to youths that fear
gang retaliation or gang pressure to join maras. While changing the odds
of granting asylum to Central American youths will not cure the prob-
lem, changing the odds may alleviate it.
VI. CONCLUSION
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras form an impoverished land
mass, which unemployment, gangs, crime, and corruption have swal-
lowed. Though international organizations cannot calculate human trag-
edy as easily as lost economic investments, no reason exists to overlook
the human tragedies that occur in Central America. In 1996, Congress
radically altered the United States' immigration laws and began whole-
sale removal of aliens who committed misdemeanors and aliens who
committed major felonies. The aliens had no avenue of relief, since Con-
gress labeled them guilty of committing "aggravated felonies," and
arrived at, to some, a strange land. Having grown up in the violent ghet-
tos of the United States, many began to use their criminal skills in their
native lands. Poor, corrupt, and weakened by civil war, their native lands
could not stop the new criminal techniques. In a land with few opportu-
nities for advancement, the removed aliens and the young men in Cen-
tral America used the new criminal and intimidation techniques as an
outlet. Those aliens deported for minor crimes also felt the impact of
unemployment. To them, joining the maras became an exit. The govern-
ments of Central America, unable to stop the crime and violence, eroded
civil liberties in the hopes of achieving security.
The story does not stop there. These gangs, born in Los Angeles,
have now migrated throughout Central America and the United States.
Although not monolithic organizations, the gangs contain traits contrast-
ing those of most gangs. The maras speak to each other. A member in El
Salvador can order the death of an individual in Maryland. The maras
engage in drg trafficking, alien trafficking, and extortion. The gang
leaders have ties to organized crime. The maras have international con-
tacts. Police in Mexico, the United States, Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador have all faced these gang members. No one suggests that the
United States' removal policy alone causes the record crime in Central
America. Similarly, no one suggests that the maras will become the new
wave of organized crime. Still, the United States' removal policy played
a critical role in unleashing the maras in Central America, and the maras
have a feel different from that of most gangs. The United States, as a
moral imperative, as a security decision, and as a policy reflection of
reality, must act quickly.
